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LIST OF PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS 
IN DISTRICT COURT 
Plaintiff: 
3D Construction and Development, LLC ("3D") 
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Old Standard Life Insurance Co. ("Old Standard")1 
Ocwen Federal Savings Bank, FSB ("Ocwen") 
Paxton R. Guymon, as successor trustee ("Mr. Guymon") 
Old Standard is the holder of the subject note and trust deed and is the real party in interest. Ocwen acted as 
servicer of the loan. Mr. Guymon served as successor trustee under the Trust Deed. 
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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should 3D be barred by judicial estoppel from contradicting its statements under 
oath in its former bankruptcy case as to the amount of the Old Standard loan and the existence of 
any offsets to such loan? 
2. Does 3D's decision not to contest the motion for relief from the automatic stay in 
its bankruptcy case prevent the application of issue preclusion? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, 3D attempts to challenge the amount of a loan given to it by Old Standard in 
contradiction to earlier statements made by 3D under oath in a prior voluntary Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case as to the amount and undisputed nature of that loan. In addition, 3D chose not 
to respond to a motion for relief from the automatic stay premised on the undisputed amount of 
this loan. The Trial Court ruled, in granting Old Standard's motion for partial summary 
judgment, that the doctrines of judicial estoppel and issue preclusion prevented 3D's effort to 
change its position. The Trial Court certified its ruling as final under Rule 54(b). 3D appeals 
this order granting the motion for partial summary judgment. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
1. On October 25, 2001, Old Standard made a loan to 3D in the principal amount of 
$3,905,000.00, plus a $2,000,000 participation fee (the "Loan"). The Loan was memorialized by 
a Promissory Note, dated October 25, 2001, and secured by a Deed of Trust of the same date. 
The Deed of Trust encumbered undeveloped property located in Box Elder County, Utah (the 
"Property"). [R. 0460-0484; see also Appellant's Appendix, Exhibit "A"]. 
2. Because of the risks associated with the Loan, and other underwriting and credit 
considerations, Old Standard issued the Loan to 3D based, in part, on 3D's agreement to a 
$2,000,000 participation fee. 3D was given the right to pay less than the full participation fee by 
paying off the loan early. 3D lost the right to obtain this discount, however, if it defaulted under 
the Loan. [R. 0460 (Promissory Note); R. 0541 (Affidavit of Dana N. Smith "Smith Aff"; R. 
0547 (Affidavit of Dana Taitch ("Taitch Aff."))]. 
3. Ocwen is the authorized servicer of the Loan for Old Standard. [R. 0541 (Smith 
Aff.)]; [R. 0547 (Taitch Aff.")]. 
4. Mr. Guymon was the successor trustee under the Trust Deed. [R. 0005]. 
5. 3D failed to make any payments under the Loan after its initial interest payment 
of $42,304.17, due on December 1, 2001. [R. 0550 (Taitch Aff.)]; [R. 0541 (Smith Aff.)]. 
6. When 3D failed to make the January 1, 2002, payment, the Loan went into 
default. [R. 0541 (Smith Aff.)]. 
7. A Default Notice was recorded against the Property on April 3, 2002. [R. 0499-
0500]. 
2 
In its Statement of Facts, 3D states as "fact" many of the mere allegations of its complaint. (See, e.g., paragraphs 
6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). Such "facts" are contested, although none are relevant to the subject order of the 
trial court. Consequently, only the relevant facts are presented above. 
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8. 3D failed to reinstate the Loan during the three month statutory reinstatement 
period. As a result, a Notice of Trustee's Sale was duly published and posted, providing notice 
of a trustee's sale scheduled for August 13, 2002. [R. 0444]. 
9. At the request of 3D, Old Standard postponed the trustee's sale until 
September 27, 2002. Two days prior to the sale, on September 25, 2002, 3D filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 7 of United States Bankruptcy Code, which imposed an 
automatic stay by operation of law and prevented Old Standard from completing its scheduled 
foreclosure. [R. 0444-0445]. 
10. Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, 3D was required to submit, under oath, an 
itemized list of its assets and debts, specifying for each debt whether it is disputed, contingent or 
unliquidated. Under oath, 3D listed the Loan as a valid, uncontingent, undisputed and liquidated 
obligation of $6,500,000. [R. 0502-0519, also attached as Exhibit "C" to Appellant's Appendix]. 
11. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), Old Standard moved for relief from the automatic 
stay. This motion was premised, in part, on the factual grounds that due to the undisputed 
amount of the Loan, there was no equity in the Property. [R. 0521-0526; also attached as Exhibit 
"D" to Appellant's Appendix]. 
12. 3D elected not to oppose the Motion for Relief. The bankruptcy trustee appointed 
for the 3D case also did not oppose the motion. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court concluded 
that, due in part to the undisputed amount of the loan, 3D had no equity in the Property and Old 
Standard was entitled to pursue its foreclosure remedy. [R. 0528-0530; also attached as Exhibit 
E to Appellant's Appendix]. 
13. Following entry of the Order Granting Relief, Old Standard published and posted 
another notice of a Trustee's Sale. [R. 0445]. 
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14. On January 7, 2003, 3D filed this action in the First Judicial District Court, 
arguing in part that the amount of the Loan was approximately $2,000,000 less that the amount 
specified in the promissory note. 3D's argument was essentially based on the contention that it 
did not owe the participation fee. [R. 0001-0022]. 
15. The trustee's sale was postponed to January 20, 2003 as a result of 3D's filing of 
a motion for a preliminary injunction. [R. 0445]. 
16. The Trial Court denied 3D's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and held that 3D 
was judicially and collaterally estopped from claiming the amount of the Loan was less than 
$6,500,000 (which included the $2 million participation fee). [R. 0346-0347]. 
17. Following the filing of a motion for partial summary judgment, on November 13, 
2004, the Trial Court ruled that, under judicial estoppel and issue preclusion, 3D was prohibited 
from now arguing that the amount of the Old Standard Loan was less than the amount stated in 
the 3D bankruptcy. [R. 0677-06687; also attached as Exhibit F" to Appellant's Appendix]. 
18. On February 18, 2004, the Trial Court entered its order granting the motion for 
partial summary judgment and certifying the matter as final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b). [R. 0700-0702]. 
19. 3D filed its notice of appeal on March 8, 2004. [R. 706-708]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent a party from seeking judicial relief by making 
statements inconsistent with its own prior sworn statements. The purpose is to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process. It applies to all judicial proceedings, including those in 
bankruptcy. 
4 
After 3D voluntarily filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it made the statement under oath that 
it owed $6,500,000 to Old Standard, without dispute, offsets or counterclaims. It also stated, 
under oath, that its property was worth $7,000,000 - effectively leaving no equity for the 
bankruptcy trustee and its creditors. Relying on the lack of equity (a required element), Old 
Standard moved the Bankruptcy Court for relief from the automatic stay. Neither 3D nor the 
bankruptcy trustee objected. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting relief. 
After becoming free from its bankruptcy, 3D then argued in the Trial Court that it in fact 
did dispute the Old Standard Loan amount and therefore claimed equity in the Property. The 
Trial Court property ruled that judicial estoppel and issue preclusion prevented this new contrary 
position. 
None of 3D's arguments why it should be allowed to change its position are availing. 
First, judicial estoppel clearly applies to statements made in bankruptcy - a judicial proceeding. 
Second, the mere fact that the bankruptcy trustee did not convert 3D's assets into cash for 
distribution to unsecured creditors does not excuse 3D from the effect of its prior statements, 
particularly in light of the fact that the trustee's lack of administration was the direct result of 
these very statements by 3D. Third, although prejudice should not be a factor required to hold 
someone to a prior statement under oath in a judicial proceeding, prejudice does exist to Old 
Standard, the bankruptcy trustee and the judicial process. Fourth, 3D's claim that both parties 
had equal access to the facts ignores that the real fact at issue - whether 3D claimed to have 
offsets or disputes with the amount of the Old Standard Loan - was solely within the knowledge 
of 3D. 
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Similarly, 3D's decision not to oppose the motion for relief does not prevent the 
application of issue preclusion. Contrary to 3D's argument, Utah law does not prohibit the 
application of issue preclusion where the opposing party decides not to respond to a motion. 
A party cannot take a position in one judicial proceeding and then turn around and take a 
contrary position with impunity in another judicial proceeding. The trial court was correct in 
preventing this effort by 3D. 3D only has itself to blame. 
ARGUMENT 
I. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL PREVENTS 3D FROM CLAIMING THAT THE 
AMOUNT OF THE OLD STANDARD LOAN IS DIFFERENT THAN WHAT 3D 
STATED, UNDER OATH, IN ITS BANKRUPTCY CASE 
Judicial estoppel, or estoppel by oath, prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by 
uttering statements inconsistent with its own sworn statements in a prior judicial proceeding. 
See, Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495-96 (Utah 1980). The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
prevents 3D from taking a position inconsistent with its own sworn statements in its bankruptcy 
case by now denying the amount of indebtedness under the Loan in this action. 
Upon filing bankruptcy, debtors must file schedules, under oath and penalty of perjury, 
disclosing all of their assets and the claims against such assets. Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936 
(9th Cir. 2001) (bankruptcy places an affirmative duty on each debtor to schedule his assets and 
liabilities). As part of its voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, 3D was required to file 
schedules, signed under oath, itemizing the amounts it owed to creditors. Bankruptcy Rule 
1007(b)(1) ("[e]xcept in a chapter 9 municipality case, the debtor.. . shall file schedules of 
assets and liabilities"); Bankruptcy Rule 1008 (schedules are to be under oath). Case law clearly 
provides that a debtor must fully and accurately reflect its financial condition in its schedules — 
an obligation that is "paramount and absolute." In Re Boone, 203 W.L. 21697881 (Bankr. CD. 
6 
111. 2003); In Re Park 246 B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Texas 2000) (one seeking the benefits of 
bankruptcy has absolute duty to disclose, for the benefit of his or her creditors, all of the debtor's 
interest in property rights). As the instructions to the Official Forms for Statements and 
Schedules provide, the debtor should specify the amount owed to each creditor and if the creditor 
asserts a claim that the Debtor disputes, it is to be so marked as a disputed claim. 
The bankruptcy process depends on honest reporting by debtors. In a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case, such as filed by 3D, the entire bankruptcy administration depends on an 
accurate listing of assets, asset values, and claim amounts. Based on the debtor's statements 
under oath, the bankruptcy trustee will make a decision as to whether there is any property 
available for distribution to creditors. If there is no property or equity from which a meaningful 
distribution to creditors can be made, the trustee issues a no-asset report and no distribution is 
made to creditors. As the Court stated in In Re Park 246 B.R. 837, 841-843 (Bankr. E.D. Texas 
2000): 
Under 11 U.S.C. § 521, a debtor is required, among other duties, to file 
schedules of assets and liabilities. One seeking benefits under Title 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code has a positive duty to disclose for the benefit of one's creditors 
all of one's interest and property rights.... The obligation is strict, and the law 
requires such schedules to be as complete and accurate as possible. The burden is 
on the debtor to complete their schedules accurately.... A paramount duty of the 
debtor is the duty to file a list of creditors, schedules and assets, liabilities, 
income, and the debtor must cooperate with the trustee in preparing a 'complete 
inventory of the property of the debtor . . . , unless such an inventory has already 
been filed.' . . .These matters are at the heart of the bankruptcy system, and their 
importance can hardly be understated. The proper 'operation of the bankruptcy 
system depends on honest reporting.' 
* * * 
Non-compliance with mandated disclosure may result in dismissal of a 
case, non-dischargeability of unscheduled debts, judicial estoppel with respect to 
claims, or a complete loss of a debtor's discharge. The law is profuse with 
precedent that bankruptcy debtors have an express, affirmative duty to disclose all 
assets, including contingent and unliquidated claims... . Viewed against the 
7 
backdrop of the bankruptcy system and the ends it seeks to achieve, the 
importance of this disclosure duty cannot be overemphasized.... (6[w]ithout... 
disclosure [required by 11 U.S.C. §521], the basic system of marshalling of 
assets and the resulting distribution of proceeds to creditors would be an 
impossible task'). 
3D filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and, in doing so, filed a sworn statement that it owed 
$6,500,000 to Old Standard, without dispute or offset. 3D's statement under oath as to what it 
owed Old Standard is not simply a ministerial act without significance or meaning. In its 
schedules, 3D represented, under oath, that it had property of $7,000,000 and debts against that 
property of an undisputed $6,500,000. Based on these statements, the bankruptcy trustee issued 
a no-asset report. 
In addition, 3D's verified statements in its bankruptcy schedules as to the value of the 
Property formed an integral part of the evidentiary basis for Old Standard's motion for relief 
from the automatic stay. [See Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay Iflf 5-6, R. 0523]. To 
establish a right to relief from the automatic stay, Old Standard was required to establish the 
value of the Property. In its motion, citing well established law that the value listed under oath in 
the Debtor's schedules is admissible evidence, Old Standard submitted the Debtor's valuation to 
the Court. See id. In fact, this was the only evidence of value. Based on this evidentiary support 
from the Debtor's own schedules, the Bankruptcy Court granted Old Standard's Motion for 
Relief entitling Old Standard to pursue its foreclosure remedy. 
In addition, if the debtor in bankruptcy has a claim of offset or a counterclaim against a 
creditor, all such offsets and counterclaims must be scheduled and disclosed. Pealo v. AAF 
McQuay, Inc., 140 F. Supp.2d 233 (N.D. N.Y. 2001) (bankruptcy debtor must disclose in 
schedules all causes of action that can be brought by the debtor); In Re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 
F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (all claims with potential must be disclosed in a bankruptcy case, even if 
8 
contingent, dependent or conditional); In Re Costello, 255 B.R. 110 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2000) 
(Chapter 7 debtor had the duty to file schedules disclosing all assets and liabilities, including all 
causes of action which could be brought by debtor). Debtors who fail to list offsets or 
counterclaims are barred by judicial estoppel from asserting such claims once bankruptcy is 
over. Here, 3D failed to schedule or disclose any offset or counterclaim regarding a challenge 
to the $2 million participation fee. 
3D's obligation to fairly and accurate disclose its financial condition extended to the 
obligation to list any claims or offsets it had against creditors such as Old Standard. In its 
bankruptcy, had 3D Construction disclosed that it believed it owed $2 million less than what Old 
Standard claimed, that claim belonged to the bankruptcy trustee, who could have administered 
this asset for the benefit of the estate. But after telling the Bankruptcy Court and the trustee that 
it had no equity in the Property, 3D then asserted in state court that it only owed approximately 
$4.5 million against the Property and consequently had equity of $2 million. In essence, in its 
bankruptcy case, 3D took the position, under oath, that it had no equity in the Property. Now, in 
this case, it claims to have equity. That kind of "playing fast and loose" is what judicial estoppel 
is designed to prevent. 
A. Bankruptcy is a Judicial Proceeding 
3D takes the position that judicial estoppel cannot apply to an oath made by a debtor in 
bankruptcy. This argument is based on the novel proposition that a bankruptcy case is not a 
3
 See, e.g., Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (PR), Inc., 989 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1993), cert 
denied, 510 U.S. 931 (1993) (failure to disclose potential claim judicially estopped debtor post-bankruptcy from 
asserting such claim); Hay v. First Interstate Bank ofKalispell, N.A., 978 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1992) (after bankruptcy, 
debtor estopped from asserting claims against creditors that it did not disclose as an asset during bankruptcy); 
Oneida Motor v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988) (debtor 
estopped from later pursuing claims against creditor due to failure to disclose such claims); In Re Okan 's Foods, 
Inc., 217 B.R. 739 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (debtor equitably and judicially estopped from asserting claim where 
debtor failed to disclose such during the bankruptcy). 
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judicial proceeding. 3D cites no authority for this proposition. This is not surprising, since 
proceedings before the bankruptcy court are performed under the jurisdiction of the United 
States District Court (28 U.S.C. §1334) and result in enforceable orders and judgments. 28 
U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) ("bankruptcy judges may . . . enter appropriate orders and judgments"). 
Courts even hold that actions of bankruptcy trustees in investigating and issuing reports fall 
within the protection granted "judicial proceedings." For example, in Weissman v. Haffett, 47 
B.R. 462, 469 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), the Court noted that "it is settled law that a bankruptcy 
proceeding is a judicial proceeding" and thus included within the protections afforded judicial 
proceedings, are a trustee's investigation and issuance of a trustee report. 
3D's argument also flies in the face of countless decisions which apply judicial estoppel 
to bankruptcy cases and, in particular, to situations arising from the debtor's statements under 
oath in its schedules of statements and affairs. As stated by the Court in Richardson v. United 
Parcel Service, 195 B.R. 737 (E.D. Mo. 1996): 
A long-standing tenet of bankruptcy law requires one seeking benefits 
under its terms to schedule, for the benefit of creditors, all his interest and 
property rights. Oneida Motor Freight v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 416 
(3rd Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S. Ct. 495, 102 L.E.D.2d 532 (1988). 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes 'a party from assuming a position in a 
legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.' Id. at 419. 'It is a 
generally-recognized proposition that one cannot play fast and loose with the 
courts . . . ' numerous courts, including this one, have held that omission or non-
disclosure of a cause of action as an asset in a bankruptcy schedule provides an 
appropriate basis for imposition of judicial estoppel. Id. at 571-72. 
B. 3D Wants to Take a Different Position in This Action Than What it Stated, 
Under Oath, in its Bankruptcy Case 
In its brief, 3D tries to explain its failure to schedule or disclose the lesser amount it now 
claims to owe Old Standard by the argument that the applicable member of 3D "understood that 
it was to include in its schedules the amount that Old Standard claimed was due, not the amount 
10 
that he believed was owed to Old Standard." (Appellants' Brief at 12). First, this argument 
ignores the simple fact that the instructions to the schedules clearly indicate that if the claim is 
disputed, contingent or unliquidated, an appropriate notation must be made on the schedules. [R. 
0515]. Second, the term "claim," as used in the Bankruptcy Code, does not refer merely to the 
allegations or "claims" of a creditor. Rather, the term "claim" is viewed from the perspective of 
the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (claim means "right to payment"). Third, 
this argument ignores the supreme importance placed on the accurate scheduling of assets and 
liabilities in all bankruptcy cases, including Chapter 7. 
In the present case, 3D itself made the statement under oath that it has no objection to or 
dispute with the amount of Old Standard's $6,500,000 debt. In this case, 3D has taken the exact 
opposite position. This is very similar to the cases where the debtor states, under oath, that it has 
no claim against a creditor and then, following bankruptcy, tries to commence an action asserting 
such a claim.4 In its bankruptcy, 3D stated under oath that it had no objection, offset, dispute or 
counterclaim to the Old Standard indebtedness. Now that is exactly what it claims to have. 
C. 3D's Obtained the Benefits of Bankruptcy and its Estate Was Not Converted 
to Cash Due to 3D's Statements Under Oath as to the Amount of the Old 
Standard Loan 
3D argues that that it should not be prohibited from taking a position in state court 
contrary to its statements under oath in its bankruptcy because the bankruptcy was not 
"successfully maintained." (Appellant's Brief at 12-13). Before the Trial Court, 3D argued that 
the bankruptcy was not successfully maintained because it did not get a discharge. [R. 0609-
0610]. After the Trial Court correctly noted that business entities are not entitled to a discharge 
in Chapter 7, [R. 0683], 3D now argues that its bankruptcy was not successfully maintained 
See authorities cited in footnote no. 3. 
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because its bankruptcy estate was not "converted to cash and distributed to its creditors." 
(Appellant's Brief at 13). 
The only reason why 3D's bankruptcy case was not converted to cash and administered 
by the trustee was because 3D represented, under oath, that there was no value in its estate. As a 
result, the trustee issued a no-asset report. 3D should not be entitled to avoid its statements 
under oath in the bankruptcy because the bankruptcy trustee relied on such statements and didn't 
administer the bankruptcy estate. 
What 3D did successfully receive was the protection of the automatic stay. 3D filed its 
bankruptcy in order to prevent a scheduled trustee's sale of the property by Old Standard. The 
filing of a bankruptcy petition "successfully" stayed this foreclosure sale, at least until the 
bankruptcy court later granted relief from the automatic stay. 
In any event, having its estate converted to cash or obtaining a discharge are not 
predicates to the imposition of judicial estoppel. Instead, judicial estoppel exists to protect the 
integrity of the bankruptcy process. In Kunica v. St. Jean Financial Inc., 233 B.R. 46 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1999), the Court rejected a similar argument to that advanced by 3D: 
It is worth noting, however, that the distinction between discharge and 
dismissal is particularly lacking in substance in the context of judicial estoppel. 
One of the rationales of this doctrine [judicial estoppel] is to preclude the risk of 
inconsistent results in separate legal proceedings; its aim, in other words, is to 
'protect the integrity of the judicial process.' In the bankruptcy context, 'the 
rationale for these [estoppel] decisions is that the integrity of the bankruptcy 
system depends on full and honest disclosure by debtors of all of their assets.' 
Thus, a number of courts have invoked judicial estoppel to prevent a party who 
failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy proceedings from asserting that claim 
after emerging from bankruptcy. 
Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
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D. Prejudice is Not an Element of Judicial Estoppel and, Even if it is, Sufficient 
Prejudice Exists 
In an effort to excuse its attempt to contradict its earlier statements under oath, 3D argues 
that Old Standard will not be prejudiced if it "is allowed to adopt a position different from that 
taken in its schedules." (Appellant's Brief at 14). First, although part of the elements of general 
estoppel, prejudice to a private party should not be an element of judicial estoppel. Second, even 
if prejudice is a required element of judicial estoppel, such prejudice exists. 
On occasion, courts cite to the existence of prejudice to the other party as an element of 
judicial estoppel. In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 132 P.2d 388 (Utah 1942), 
such language can be found. An increasing number of cases and commentators, however, have 
noted that the element of prejudice to a private party should not be an element of judicial 
estoppel. For example, one such commentator noted: 
[C]ourts have blurred the distinction by occasionally mislabeling as "judicial 
estoppel" that which is really equitable estoppel. . . . The policy objective of 
equitable estoppel is "to ensure fairness in the relationship between the parties." 
A party may invoke equitable estoppel to prevent his opponent from changing 
positions if (1) he was an adverse party in the prior proceeding; (2) he 
detrimentally relied upon his opponent's prior position; and (3) he would now be 
prejudiced if a court permitted his opponent to change positions. Equitable 
estoppel "focuses on the relationship between the parties," and is designed to 
protect litigants from injury caused by "less than scrupulous opponents." By 
contrast, judicial estoppel focuses on "the relationship between the litigant and the 
judicial system," and is designed "to protect the integrity of the judicial process." 
. . . By definition, equitable estoppel requires privity, reliance, and prejudice 
because the doctrine concentrates on the relationship between the parties to a 
specific case. Conversely, none of these elements is or should be required 
under the judicial estoppel doctrine. Since judicial estoppel is concerned with 
"the relationship between the party to be estopped and the judicial system," 
the identity of the party invoking the estoppel is irrelevant. The gravamen of 
judicial estoppel is not privity, reliance, or prejudice. Rather, it is the 
intentional assertion of an inconsistent position that perverts the judicial 
machinery. 
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Boyers, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 1244, 1248-49 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Following Tracy Loan, Utah Courts have recognized that the language of Tracy Loan was 
too broad. In Masters v. Worsley, 111 P.2d 499, 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Court stated that: 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co, v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132, P.2d 
388, 390 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial 
estoppel must show that he or she has done something or omitted to do something 
in reliance on the other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, and will be 
prejudiced if the facts are different from those upon which he or she relied. Id. 
However, "there is no estoppel where there was no reliance and the parties had 
equal knowledge of the facts." Id. 132 P.2d at 390-391. However, in Richards v. 
Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971), the court clarified that the 
doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues actually 
litigated, not those which could have been determined. The purpose of judicial 
estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as a 
knowing misrepresentation or a fraud on the court. 
See, also, International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 n.4 (Utah 1979) (language in 
Tracy loan that judicial estoppel requires parties and issues to be the same was a "concededly 
overbroad statement.") 
In Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 705 (Utah 1985) (dissenting op.), Justice Durham 
explained why judicial estoppel should not require the existence of prejudice to a private party. 
Instead, it is the adverse effect on the judicial process that judicial estoppel is designed to 
protect: 
This case does not involve specific prejudice to defendant or reliance by her on 
plaintiffs making of the earlier sworn statements, it being obvious she could not 
have relied on the truth of the statements. I believe, however, that the principle of 
judicial estoppel has a long and independent public policy justification, namely, 
the need to uphold the sanctity of oaths and the integrity of the judicial process. 
Thus, the requirement of prejudice to an adverse party which is part of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel need not be imposed in the case of judicial 
estoppel. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Even if prejudice were a necessary element of judicial estoppel, such prejudice exists in 
this case. As a direct consequence of 3D's statements under oath in its bankruptcy, the trustee 
did not administer the estate. Has 3D informed the trustee that it had $2,000,000 in equity, the 
trustee would have exercised his right to administer this asset as well as the claims between the 
estate and Old Standard. Bankruptcy trustees have full authority, with Bankruptcy Court 
oversight, to settle and resolve claims against the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541; Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, 9019. Old Standard, therefore, would have had the opportunity to 
resolve this matter with an independent third party - the trustee. In fact, due to 3D's statements 
of the undisputed amount of Old Standard's claim, not only did 3D not oppose Old Standard's 
motion for relief, but the trustee did not oppose it as well. As a result of 3D's statements in 
bankruptcy, the trustee did not take control over the estate and the Bankruptcy Court eventually 
allowed Old Standard the right to foreclose 3D's and the bankruptcy estate's interest in the 
Property. Clearly, if 3D is allowed to contradict its statements under oath, prejudice will result 
to the trustee, Old Standard and, most importantly, the bankruptcy process itself. 
E. Only 3D Knew of its Claims Why it Does Not Owe the Stated Amount of the 
Loan 
3D further argues that Old Standard had equal access to the facts because it had the 
original promissory note and could easily have determined the amount due on the debt. 
Appellant's Brief at 15. Therefore, 3D cannot be judicially estopped from changing its 
statements in this action. 
First, as stated above, reliance should not be an element of judicial estoppel. Judicial 
estoppel is designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process, a goal independent of whether 
a party relied on the earlier statement. A party should not be allowed to play "fast and loose" 
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with the judicial process simply because only the Court and the judicial process relied on the 
statements under oath. 
In any event, this argument misses the point. 3D's bankruptcy statements under oath 
were not simply a mathematical computation under the note. Instead, 3D now claims that, 
despite the express terms of the note and any calculations based on such terms, the actual amount 
due Old Standard should be less. 3D alleges" to have claims or offsets justifying why the full 
amount stated under the note is not due and payable. The existence of these claims are contrary 
to the statements in the bankruptcy that no such claims existed. Only 3D, however, knew 
whether it had these unstated claims or offsets and whether it would pursue them. 
Although Old Standard could have, and in fact has, computed the amounts due under the Note, it 
could not have known what was in the mind of the members of 3D. As to the subject issue, 
whether 3D claimed certain offsets against the amounts due under the Note, Old Standard did not 
have equal access to such information. Only 3D knew what 3D intended to claim or not claim. 
II. 3D'S DECISION NOT TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION FOR RELIEF DOES 
NOT PREVENT THE APPLICATION OF ISSUE PRECLUSION 
3D asserts that Utah law prohibits the application of issue preclusion to a judgment 
rendered after the opposing party decides not to respond to the motion. Since 3D chose not to 
respond to the motion for relief in the automatic stay, 3D asserts that it is now free to take a 
contrary position in this case. 3D overstates Utah law. 
3D cites four Utah cases to support its argument that Utah law prohibits issue preclusion 
arising from a judgment rendered after a party failed to respond. For example, 3D cites Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996) for the proposition that 
the Utah Supreme Court did not give collateral estoppel effect to a determination of the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees "even though reasonableness issues could have been raised in a 
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prior divorce action." (Appellant's Brief at 18.) Actually, the Court in Jones Waldo found that 
the applicable issue could not have been raised in the prior proceeding. There, in connection 
with a divorce proceeding, the client's attorney submitted an attorney's fee affidavit seeking a 
judgment against the client's husband for reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in the 
proceeding. In a subsequent lawsuit against the client for unpaid fees, the attorney argued that 
the client should be collaterally estopped on the basis of the attorney fee affidavit submitted on 
her behalf at her divorce trial. The court disagreed, finding that, since the affidavit was 
submitted by her own attorney on her behalf, the client did not have a real opportunity to contest 
the fees at the divorce trial: 
In the case at hand, however, Dawson had no real opportunity to raise her 
argument on the reasonableness of fees in the divorce proceeding. It is unrealistic 
to expect that Dawson could have challenged the reasonableness of her own 
attorney's fees at the trial where plaintiff was her only advocate. 
Id. at 1371. Far from holding that collateral estoppel should never apply in cases where one 
party decides to concede a matter, but has the opportunity to litigate, the Jones, Waldo decision 
merely held that no such opportunity existed. 
Similarly, 3D misconstrues Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). There, a 
debtor in bankruptcy filed an adversary proceeding asserting several claims. The primary claim 
involved the allegation that the value of the lender's lien in excess of the fair market value of the 
property could be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 506. The debtor also asserted that the lender 
should be required to reconvey a lien due to an earlier payment. The bankruptcy court ruled on 
the primary issue, which was appealed several times and eventually was decided by the United 
States Supreme Court. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). The argument that the lien 
should be reconveyed, however, appears to have never been decided by the bankruptcy court. 
Since there was no decision by the bankruptcy court on that issue, the Utah Supreme Court held 
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that collateral estoppel was inapplicable. In the present case, however, the bankruptcy has ruled 
on the motion for relief. 
State of Utah v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) is relied on by 3D for the 
proposition that Utah does not allow collateral estoppel in cases of default judgments. There, a 
reply to a counterclaim against an individual was stricken and default entered after the 
counterclaim defendant left the state and failed to participate in discovery. The Court refused to 
apply collateral estoppel against the State of Utah, because the default had been entered without 
evidence and simply as a matter of procedure. In so doing, the court noted no firm rule of 
collateral estoppel in default judgments, per se, but stressed that form over substance should 
control: 
As a technical legal term, 'merits' has been defined as a matter of substance, as 
distinguished from a matter of form. In the context of res judicata, 'merits' has 
been interpreted to mean real or substantive grounds of action or defense as 
distinguished from matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction or form. 'A 
judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the 
respective rights and duties of the parties based o n . . . facts in evidence upon 
which the rights of recovery depend, irrespective of formal, technical, or dilatory 
objections or contentions. 
Id. at 116 (citations omitted). 
3D also quotes from International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979) to 
support its argument. [Appellant's Brief at 18]. 3D, however, fails to include in its quote the 
sentences immediately following, which describe the purpose behind the statement that collateral 
estoppel should apply to issues that were actually presented and litigated. The following is the 
full quote: 
But it is important to keep in mind this distinction between the rule of res judicata 
and that of collateral estoppel. While as indicated above, the former applies both 
as to issues which were actually tried and those which could have been tried in a 
prior action, the latter does not apply to issues that merely 'could have been tried' 
in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and 
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tried in that case. The primary reason for this is that if the party against 
whom such a defense is invoked was not a party to the prior action, he would 
have no choice as to litigating an issue that merely 'could have been tried9 in 
the prior suit; and if the material issue was not actually asserted and 
determined, there is no basis upon which it could be concluded that he had 
actually taken a different position on the issue and should now be estopped 
from asserting a different position in the instant suit. 
Id. at 517 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, we are not dealing with an attempt to hold a party to a determination 
made in another case to which it wasn't a party. 3D was the debtor in its bankruptcy case and is 
the plaintiff in this case. In addition, contrary to the facts presented to the Ruscetta Court, the 
order granting relief from the automatic stay was based on evidence. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 
362, Old Standard had the burden of establishing that 3D had no equity in the property. 
Consequently, Old Standard submitted and relied on the statement in 3D's schedules, filed under 
oath. 3D elected not to oppose its own sworn statements and oppose the motion. This was not a 
case where the bankruptcy court entered 3D's default based on no evidence and based simply on 
"formal, technical, or dilatory objections or contentions." Instead, the motion, and the resulting 
order, were based on 3D's own sworn statements. 
Lastly, 3D cites the case of In re Bysdrek, 17 B.R. 894 (B.R. E.D. Penn. 1982) for the 
proposition that an order granting relief from the automatic stay upon the debtor's failure to 
defend, is akin to a default judgment. This case is instructive. There, the debtor filed bankruptcy 
one day prior to a scheduled foreclosure sale. After the lender moved for relief from the 
automatic stay, the debtor declined to respond. Relief was granted by the bankruptcy court. The 
case was subsequently dismissed. Again, just prior to the rescheduled foreclosure sale, another 
bankruptcy case was filed. The bankruptcy court in the second case ruled that the order granting 
relief in the first case was res judicata. The district court agreed: 
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If, indeed, the default judgment was not res judicata, a case for relief from 
the stay need never be tried in a Chapter 13 proceeding. The debtor would be 
better served by allowing judgment by default not to be entered. Once the default 
judgment was entered, the case would be voluntarily dismissed under § 1307(b) 
or payments to the trustee could be halted. In either fashion, the end result would 
be the same. The case would be dismissed. When a creditor commenced action 
to collect his debt, a new petition would be filed and the automatic stay re-
imposed, thereby thwarting the creditor from the exercise of legitimate rights. A 
new complaint would have to be filed and the very game could begin all over 
again. 
* * * 
A default judgment is as conclusive as that which is rendered after an 
answer and full trial. The res judicata effect of a default judgment prevents either 
party from relitigating the same cause of action. Judgment by default is 
conclusive between the parties as to the cause of action upon which the judgment 
is based. The key factors are that there be notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
If these elements are present, the res judicata effect of a default judgment cannot 
be attacked. 
Id. at 896 (citations omitted). 
To have been fully and fairly litigated, the requirement is not that the matter be actually 
litigated. Rather, the parties must only have had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 
In Smith Machinery Company, Inc. v. Hesston Corporation, 878 F.2d 1290, 1293 (10th Cir. 
1989), the court explained, "[t]his court and others have conditioned the invocation against a 
party of collateral estoppel and law of the case on that party's prior opportunity to have fully and 
fairly presented and argued its claims." (emphasis added). See also Anaheim Savings and Loan 
Assoc, v. Evans, 30 B.R. 530, 531 (9th Cir. BAP 1983) (explaining that "[a]n order confirming a 
chapter 13 plarv is res judicata as to all justiciable issues which were or could have been decided 
at the confirmation hearing."); In re Bradley, 38 B.R. 425, 432 (CD. Cal. 1984) (concluding that 
"the debtor/defendant in a stay action should be precluded from raising in a subsequent action 
any defense that he could have raised in a prior [stay] action"). 
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Similarly, 3D was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard in response to Old 
Standard's Motion for Relief from the Stay. 3D elected not to respond. If 3D wanted to prevent 
relief from the automatic stay, it was incumbent upon it to show there was equity in the Property, 
and to challenge the amount of the indebtedness set forth in Old Standard's Motion for Relief. 
3D had a full and fair opportunity to litigate or otherwise challenge the amount of the stated 
indebtedness. It chose not to. 3D cannot now attempt to resurrect an argument that was directly 
at issue in the bankruptcy case, but which it purposefully decided not to raise. See id.; see also 
Klein v. Whitehead, 389 A.2d 374, 384-85 (Md. App. 1978) (explaining that collateral estoppel 
applies, even for orders entered by default, for issues that were central to prior action, meaning 
same evidentiary facts would sustain both issues). 
In Monument Record Corporation v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp^, 71 B.R. 853 
(M.D. Term. 1987), the F.D.I.C, as creditor, filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. In 
connection with that proceeding, the bankruptcy court entered a consent order recognizing that 
the F.D.I.C. had a valid security interest in the collateral, and granting relief from the stay. 
Subsequently, the trustee commenced an adversary proceeding asserting that the F.D.I.C.'s 
security interest was unperfected and voidable. The court rejected the trustee's arguments, 
concluding lliat the consent order granting relief from the stay constituted a final order for i^sue 
preclusion purposes. See idL at 860. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited a litany of 
opinions where courts have held that orders granting relief from the automatic stay are final 
orders. See id. at 857-58; see also id. n.5 (citing various annotations stating "it seems well 
settled, as a general proposition, that a judgment or decree, though entered by consent or 
agreement of the parties, is res judicata to the same extent as if entered after contest"). 
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In American General Finance, Inc. v. Tippins, 221 B.R. 11 (N.D. Ala. 1998), former 
Chapter 13 debtors filed suit against a lender, asserting common law claims of fraud, 
misrepresentation, conspiracy and consumer credit claims. The claims arose out of the same 
credit transaction forming the basis of the proof of claim filed by the lender in the debtors' prior 
Chapter 13 cases. The Court held that the debtors' claims were barred by the preclusive effect of 
the Chapter 13 plan confirmation orders. The Court explained: 
The [debtors] incorrectly contend that because their particular state 
court claims were not raised at confirmation, no identity of claims 
exist, and therefore the State court action is not barred by claim 
preclusion. It is well settled that claim preclusion applies not only 
to the claims advanced in a prior case, but to all claims arising out 
of the same nucleus of operative facts. Generally, claims arise out 
of the same cause of action when they arise out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions or out of the same core of 
operative facts. 
* * * 
An order confirming a chapter 13 plan is claim preclusive as to all 
justiciable issues which were or could have been decided before 
confirmation. 
Id. at 23. 
Contrary to 3D's assertion, the subject issue in Old Standard's Motion for Relief from 
Stay is the same as the relevant issues in this case - the amount of the Old Standard loan. In the 
motion for relief, the primary issue is whether 3D had equity in the property. This determination 
required a finding as to the value of the Property and the amount of the Old Standard debt. The 
amount of the Old Standard debt is the same issue that 3D wishes to contest in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent what 3D is attempting to do in this action - to 
take a position contrary to statements under oath in its bankruptcy case. Similarly, issue 
preclusion bars 3D's efforts to raise the issue of the amount of Old Standard's Loan after having 
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declined the opportunity to raise this issue when it was central to the motion for relief As the 
Trial Court stated in its Memorandum Decision at 10, "[l]ike the parties in Collins v. Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment, 52 P.3d 1257, 3D 'made a calculated choice to forego . . . [their bankruptcy 
remedies] . . . and that the predicament in which they find themselves is of their own making."' 
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